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Humans are highly social animals and often help unrelated
individuals that may never reciprocate the altruist’s favour1–5.
This apparent evolutionary puzzle may be explained by the
altruist’s gain in social image: image-scoring bystanders, also
known as eavesdroppers, notice the altruistic act and therefore
are more likely to help the altruist in the future5–7. Such complex
indirect reciprocity based on altruistic acts may evolve only after
simple indirect reciprocity has been established, which requires
two steps. First, image scoring evolves when bystanders gain
personal benefits from information gathered, for example, by
finding cooperative partners8–10. Second, altruistic behaviour in
the presence of such bystanders may evolve if altruists benefit
from access to the bystanders. Here, we provide experimental
evidence for both of the requirements in a cleaning mutualism
involving the cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus. These cleaners
may cooperate and remove ectoparasites from clients or they may
cheat by feeding on client mucus11,12. As mucus may be preferred
over typical client ectoparasites13, clients must make cleaners feed
against their preference to obtain a cooperative service. We found
that eavesdropping clients spent more time next to ‘cooperative’
than ‘unknown cooperative level’ cleaners, which shows that
clients engage in image-scoring behaviour. Furthermore, trained
cleaners learned to feed more cooperatively when in an ‘image-
scoring’ than in a ‘non-image-scoring’ situation.
Early game theoretic models of indirect reciprocity based on image
scoring assumed that every single act is altruistic and that image
scoring is already present in a population, as is the strategy to help
individuals that have been observed to help others5–7. Thus, these
models do not address why image scoring and helping should evolve
in the first place.
Communication network theory14, however, provides a frame-
work for indirect reciprocity based on image scoring. Image scoring,
called eavesdropping in the communication literature15, involves
collecting information on interactions between third parties where
the information gained provides direct benefits to the bystander. This
image-scoring behaviour in bystanders leads to changes in their
behaviour, best documented in situations involving conflict, where
individuals may adjust their fighting behaviour according to knowl-
edge gained by observing their opponent16,17. Thus, bystanders
attribute an image score about fighting parameters to observed
individuals. Eavesdropping in agonistic contexts has been documen-
ted across a wide range of animal taxa15. In the context of
cooperation, image scoring may evolve if individuals differ consist-
ently in the amount that they cooperate10,18. Here, observers may
select individuals as partners for cooperative tasks based on how
cooperative they are in their current interaction. Once such egoistic
image scoring/eavesdropping has evolved, interacting individuals are
selected to adjust appropriately their behaviour according to the
presence or absence of bystanders (termed “audience effects”19).
Therefore, in the context of cooperation, image-scoring observers
would select for cooperative behaviour as an audience effect, as it
would provide the altruist with access to a cooperating partner.
Altruism based on image scoring and indirect reciprocity may
occur in symmetric games (prisoner’s dilemma-type games) where
both partners may cooperate or cheat. However, the game may also
be asymmetric where only one class of players can choose between
helping and cheating its partner, while the other class of players
collects crucial information by image scoring. For example, males
may use helping as a behavioural handicap while females are the
eavesdroppers8–10. In addition, many interspecific mutualisms con-
sist of asymmetric investment by one player while the returns of the
partner come as a by-product20—cleaning mutualism is a typical
example21.
The interactions between the cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus and
its client fishes are a well-known example of interspecific mutual-
ism22. Cleaners may cooperate and remove ectoparasites from client
fish, or they may cheat by feeding on client mucus11,12, which they
prefer over typical client ectoparasites13. Hence, there is a temptation
for cleaners to cheat. Although a few piscivorous clients could cheat
by attempting to eat the cleaner fish22, the vast majority of clients
consist of species that do not predate on fish23. Such clients have no
means to exploit a cleaner fish, precluding tit-for-tat-like24 control
strategies. Instead, field observations suggest that image scoring is
one of several alternative mechanisms21 used by clients to avoid
exploitation by cheating cleaners. Client fish almost always invite a
Figure 1 | Experimental set-up to test for image scoring. Aquarium
(95 £ 36 £ 36 cm)with a black cloth over themiddle and 40-Wincandescent
lights over the side compartments, enhancing the one-way mirrors, which
allowed the client in themiddle to see the cleaner fish and client model in the
side compartments. Pipes served as shelters for fish. Cooperative cleaners
foraged on prawn (0.002 g) smeared on the model, whereas unknown
cooperation level cleaners swam around freely. The time the client spent
next to each cleaner with its entire body out of the shelter was recorded.
Hatched area indicates opaque sliding covers.
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 cleaner’s inspection if they witnessed that the cleaner’s last inter-
action ended without conflict, invite less if they do not have such
knowledge, and invite the least if the last interaction ended with
conflict25,26. Furthermore, cleaner fish are more cooperative in the
presence of bystanders than when they are alone with one client26.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that image scoring by
client fish is a selfish act used to find a cooperative cleaner or to avoid
a cheating cleaner, resulting in (more) cooperative behaviour in
cleaners in the presence of bystanders. Here, we test this hypothesis
experimentally.
To test whether client fish engage in image-scoring behaviour, we
offered a client fish the choice of interacting with two cleaner fish
(Fig. 1): one cleaner appeared to behave ‘cooperatively’ with a model
of a client whereas the other did not interact with the model (that is, it
had an ‘unknown cooperative level’). Client fish spent significantly
more than 50% of their time near the cooperative than near the
unknown cooperative level cleaner (Fig. 2). This experiment was
done twice in consecutive years and both results were significant (one
sample Wilcoxon signed rank-sum test with H 0 ¼ 50%: 2002,
n ¼ 14, T ¼ 18.5, P ¼ 0.04; 2003, n ¼ 14, T ¼ 16, P ¼ 0.02).
The second experiment, which tested whether cleaner fish foraging
behaviour differed in an image-scoring situation compared with a
non-image-scoring situation, was based on the following logic:
because cleaners may prefer client mucus over ectoparasites13, they
must feed against their preference (that is, not cheat) during a current
interaction to gain access to an observing client. After previous
experiments on partner control mechanisms in cleaning mutual-
ism27, we replaced clients, mucus and parasites with plates on levers,
and by presenting preferred prawn and less-preferred fish flakes on
the plates, respectively (Fig. 3). The levers allowed us to control the
plates’ response to cleaner fish foraging behaviour according to
predetermined rules. As a baseline, all cleaners were offered only
one plate (single plate) (Fig. 3a). Furthermore, cleaners were tested in
one of two scenarios involving two plates presented simultaneously.
In the control no-image-scoring scenario, each plate remained in the
aquarium until the cleaner ate one prawn item off it (Fig. 3b). In the
experimental image-scoring scenario, the removal of one plate when
a cleaner fish fed on prawn led to the immediate removal of the
second plate (so the cleaner could not eat anything from the latter)
(Fig. 3c). Thus, in the image-scoring scenario, cleaners could eat only
the two flake items (FF) on the first plate to then access the second
plate, ignoring the two remaining prawn items on the first plate
(Fig. 3c). On all other plates, they could eat two flakes and then a
prawn item (FFP) for maximal foraging success. Therefore, to
maximize their food intake, we predicted that cleaners should eat
more against their preference (a ratio of flake items eaten to total
items eaten) while interacting with the first plate in the image-scoring
scenario than while feeding from any other plate. Comparing the
single-plate situation against the two-plate situation tested the
alternative hypothesis that cleaner fish may be more cooperative
when more food is available, independently of any image-scoring
behaviour of clients.
Within treatment groups, we found that in the image-scoring
scenario, cleaners fed significantly more against their preference
when interacting with the first plate in the two-plate situation than
when interacting with the second plate or in the single-plate situation
(Friedman test, n ¼ 12, x22 ¼ 12.5, P ¼ 0.002, post-hoc multiple
comparisons P , 0.01) (Fig. 4). In the non-image-scoring scenario,
the foraging behaviour of cleaners on all three plates did not differ
significantly (Friedman test, n ¼ 12, x22 ¼ 1.3, P . 0.05) (Fig. 4).
Between treatment groups, cleaners ate significantly more against
their preference on the first plate in the image-scoring scenario than
on the first plate in the non-image-scoring (control) scenario
(Mann–Whitney U-test, m ¼ 12, n ¼ 12, Z ¼ 3.15, P ¼ 0.002;
Fig. 4). Although cleaners did not always eat items in the sequence
that would maximize their food intake, they still also ate against their
preference (their preference being prawn27) in all situations (Fig. 4).
In the image-scoring scenario, all cleaners sometimes ate only flakes
from the first plates (between 2–12 out of 20 trials, median ¼ 7
trials), which allowed them to access the second plate. This happened
significantly less often in the no-image-scoring scenario (between
0–4 out of 20 trials, median ¼ 1.5 trials) where the second plate
could still be accessed (Mann–Whitney U-test, m ¼ 12, n ¼ 12,
Z ¼ 3.61, P , 0.001).
Our results show that both requirements for simple indirect
reciprocity—image scoring by clients and an increased level of
cooperation by cleaners in the presence of image-scoring clients—
exist in a cleaning mutualism. Our experimental results confirm
interpretations based on field observations25,26. Under natural con-
ditions, cleaners feed against their preference (that is, eat ectopara-
sites rather than client mucus) to reduce the risk of conflict with their
Figure 2 | Client fish conduct image scoring. The percentage of time a client
fish spent near the cooperative cleaner fish compared to 50% (50% being the
amount of time expected if the behaviour was random (dashed line)).
Clients could also approach an unknown cooperation level cleaner. The
same experiment was conducted in consecutive years. Median and
interquartiles are given.
Figure 3 | Experimental set-up to test for indirect reciprocity. Optimal
feeding solutions in a foraging experiment where eating fish flakes (F) was
allowed whereas eating prawn (P) resulted in immediate termination of an
interaction due to plate removal. a, Single-plate situation. b, Two plates are
removed independently when the cleaner fish eats a prawn item. c, Two-plate
situationwhere eating prawn on one leads to the removal of both plates. Half
of the cleaners were tested in a and b, the other half in a and c. Plates were
coloured in two ways to allow discrimination: hatched area, pink; stippled
area, beige.
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 current client in order to gain access to nearby observing clients25.
Although eavesdropping in communication networks may promote
increased levels of aggression in the context of animal conflict15–17,28,
our data on cleaning mutualism show that eavesdropping may also
result in increased levels of cooperation. In our system, indirect
reciprocity based on image-scoring clients probably requires only
relatively simple cognitive processes. Clients do not have to remem-
ber observed interactions as they react immediately to what they
observe. Cleaners have over 2,000 client interactions per day11 and
therefore constantly receive feedback about the consequences of their
actions, allowing them to associate their behaviour with foraging
success. It will be a challenge to find more complex forms of indirect
reciprocity and image scoring5—in particular the purely altruistic
system that humans are capable of playing2—in other animals.
METHODS
For additional information, see Supplementary Information
Image-scoring behaviour in client fish. Trials were done in an experimental
aquarium with three compartments, separated from each other by one-way
mirrors. The mirrors allowed viewing into the side compartments from the
middle one (Fig. 1). We placed two client models in the side compartments that
each held a cleaner fish, Labroides dimidiatus. To create differences between the
inspection behaviour of the two cleaner fish with their model, only one model
had mashed prawn (0.004 g) spread on it. The model with food was placed in the
compartment holding cleaner fish trained to feed off the model, whereas the
model without food was placed in the compartment holding cleaner fish familiar
to a model having no food on it. Therefore, the former cleaner would interact
more with the model (cooperative cleaner) than the latter (unknown
cooperation level cleaner). This method worked, as 27 out of 28 cleaners with
a model with prawn on it interacted longer with the model than their ‘partner’
cleaner on the other side. Cooperative cleaners interacted on average for 250 s
with the model (range 20–550 s), about 12.5 times longer than cleaners with a
model without food (average 20 s, range 0–130 s). To control for the presence of
food, an equal amount of prawn was placed in the other cleaner’s compartment,
but it dropped to the bottom where it was ignored by the cleaners. Food on the
model was on the side facing the client Scolopsis bilineatus in the middle
compartment. Opaque barriers covering the mirrors were removed as soon as
both models were in place and fish behaviour recorded for 10 min. We recorded
the amount of time the client spent in a designated area near each cleaner (Fig. 1)
and the time each cleaner spent interacting with the model, estimated by a scan
sample at 10-s intervals. Trials were scheduled so that cooperative cleaners were
at each side of the aquaria in 50% of trials to account for any preference of the
client for a particular side. Clients spent on average 320 s (range 86–599 s) of
their time near either cleaner fish (that is, with their full body out of the shelter to
either side).
Cleaner fish indirect reciprocity experiment. The experimental set-up allowed
us (1) to offer two types of food as distinct items visible to the experimenter,
hence enabling us to see exactly what item a cleaner fish ate with each bite; (2) to
remove a plate immediately when a cleaner ate a preferred food item; and (3) to
offer two plates simultaneously and manipulate the presence of the second plate
according to the cleaner’s foraging behaviour.
First learning phase. Following methods described in ref. 13, we trained cleaners
that eating less-preferred fish flakes was allowed whereas eating preferred prawn
led to the immediate removal of a plate. Plate removal was done using a lever
attached to the plate. A total of six learning trials was done every 2 h, four trials
per day.
Second learning phase and experiment. We conducted six rounds of the
experiment without scoring the cleaners’ behaviour, followed by 20 experimental
rounds. We used two different-looking plates (10 £ 6 cm) (Fig. 3). Each round
consisted of two trials 30 min apart, one with two plates present and one with a
single plate present. The following round started 60 min later, so the experiment
was spread over 3 days. Twelve cleaners were used for each of the control and
experimental groups. The key difference between the experimental and the
control group occurred in the two-plate situation: the control cleaners (non-
image-scoring scenario) could eat from the first plate until they ate a prawn item,
after which the plate was removed, and then move on to the second plate until
they ate a prawn item, after which the second plate was removed (Fig. 3b). Thus,
the second bystander plate did not form an image of the cleaner’s behaviour. The
experimental (image-scoring scenario) cleaners, however, faced the problem that
eating prawn on one plate led to the removal of both plates (Fig. 3c). Thus, the
second bystander plate could form an image and respond negatively to the
cleaner, by leaving and avoiding an interaction, if the cleaner cheated the first
plate. Given these rules of plate behaviour, cleaner fish had to use varying rules to
optimize their foraging success: the optimal solutions shown in Fig. 3.
The cleaner was kept to one half of the aquarium with a clear partition, while
the plate(s) was placed against an aquarium side (always the same side) in the
other half. Once the plate(s) was in place, we removed the partition so that the
cleaner could begin foraging. For each cleaner, we calculated the percentage of
flake items eaten per plate per scenario.
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